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GOING TO HELL IN A HHS NOTICE: THE
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE’S NEXT
IMPERMISSIBLE BURDEN ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
TREY O’CALLAGHAN*
INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) requirement that eligible religious
organizations submit a notice objecting to providing their employees
contraceptive coverage (Accommodation) if they religiously object to
contraception or abortifacients is as simple as filing a piece of paper. But to
a collection of Catholic petitioners complying with this requirement gives
rise to “scandal” and causes them to “materially cooperate” with sin. Filing
a piece of paper may seem far outside any exercise of religion, but these
groups sincerely believe that the one page notice burdens their religious
beliefs.
Zubik v. Burwell,1 like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,2 presents a
conflict between the ACA and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), a statute that gives religious groups a shield and a sword against
federal laws and regulations that interfere with their free exercise of
religion. In Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court held that RFRA prohibits the
Government from forcing certain closely-held, religious corporations to
provide contraceptive coverage to their employees. Here the Court should
extend Hobby Lobby and hold that the accommodation impermissibly
burdens these religious groups’ beliefs under the demanding RFRA statute.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3

The ACA requires group health plans to provide, without cost sharing,
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) cert.
granted in part sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva
Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015).
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, n.28 (2014).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C § 18001 (2012).
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preventive care for women.4 Under that statutory authority, the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) adopted regulations that require
health plans to cover contraceptive services for women (the “Contraceptive
Mandate” or “Mandate”), but it carved out certain religious exceptions and
accommodations.5
A “religious employer” is exempted.6 The “religious employer”
classification is taken from the Internal Revenue Code’s church
classification.7 In contrast, a nonprofit that is religiously opposed to part or
all of the contraceptive mandate (eligible organization) is accommodated.8
If accommodated, an eligible organization is not required to contract or pay
for contraceptive coverage.9 Instead, the eligible organization’s third-party
administrator (TPA) or health insurance issuer (collectively “Third Party”)
pays for and administers the service.10
To receive the accommodation, the organization must either provide its
Third Party a form certifying its religious objection to any or all
contraceptive services (Form 700), or send HHS an objection (HHS Notice)
alongside information about its insurance provider and plan.11 In this latter
case, HHS notifies the Department of Labor about the eligible
organization’s objection, and the Department informs the eligible
organization’s Third Party (DOL Notice).12 The Government states that this
information is “the minimum information necessary . . . to determine which
entities are covered by the accommodation, to administer the
accommodation, and to implement” the contraceptive mandate.13Also, an
eligible organization must continually update HHS with any new
information.14 If an eligible organization does not comply with the
accommodation or provide contraceptive coverage to its employees, the
Government imposes a severe monetary penalty.15
When a Third Party receives a Form 700 or DOL Notice, and if it
agrees to “remain in a contractual relationship with the eligible

4. Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
5. Geneva, 778 F.3d at 427.
6. Id. at 428.
7. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015).
8. Geneva, 778 F.3d at 428.
9. Id. at 429.
10. Id. at 429.
11. Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 2015).
12. Id. at 949.
13. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under The ACA, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,095 (Aug.
27, 2014).
14. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715–2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2015).
15. Dordt, 801 F.3d at 950.
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organization,” it must “provide or arrange[] payments for contraception
services” for the plan’s beneficiaries.16 A Third Party must also provide
notice to the eligible organization’s plan beneficiaries that it—not the
eligible organization—is administering and funding the beneficiaries’
contraceptive coverage.17 The Third Party may seek reimbursement and
additional compensation from the federal government for providing these
services.18
Petitioners (Catholic Groups)19 are twenty-nine employers that
religiously object to the contraceptive mandate and the mandate’s
accommodation.20 The Catholic Groups want to provide their employees21
health insurance.22 But the Catholic Groups contend that complying with
the contraceptive mandate’s accommodation violates their religious
beliefs.23
The Catholic Groups’ object to the contraceptive mandate because they
believe that “human life begins at conception, and that certain ‘preventive’
services that interfere with conception or terminate a pregnancy are
immoral” or sinful.24 Furthermore, the Catholic Church prohibits “material
cooperation”—i.e., “facilitating the wrongdoing of others.”25 And it
prohibits “giving scandal”—i.e., “tempting others, by words or actions, to
engage in immoral conduct.”26 The Catholic Groups believe that complying
with the contraceptive mandate directly or via the accommodation causes
them to violate these tenants of faith because filing a notice triggers an
obligation for Third Parties to provide the objectionable coverage to the
Catholic Groups’ female employees.27 Also, they object to the

16. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715–2713A (2015) (describing requirements for TPAs); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.131(c)(1)(i) (2015) (describing similar requirements for insurance issuers).
17. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015).
18. Id.
19. For simplicity, Petitoners are referred to as Catholic Groups although some belong to
different Christian denominations.
20. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35,
15-105, 15-119, 15-191 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]; Brief for
Petitioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453 & 14-505 at 19, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4,
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Zubik Petitioners].
21. “Employees” is used for simplicity even though some beneficiaries are students.
22. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 16–18 (noting they have been providing their
employees three types of high-quality health plans without coverage for abortifacients or contraception:
self-insured plans, self-insured church plans, and insured plans).
23. Id. at 18–19.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 19. “Female employees” is used throughout the commentary to include any male
employee with female relatives or dependents covered under his health care plan.
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accommodation because it forces them to maintain a contractual
relationship with abortifacient providers.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Enacting RFRA
Congress enacted RFRA29 after the Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith30 overturned, in most contexts, Sherbert v. Verner31 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder.32 Sherbert and Yoder held that a law that substantially
burdens a person’s religious exercise is strictly scrutinized. Now under
Smith generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise
but are otherwise valid are typically constitutional.33
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA, which purports to
reinstate the Sherbert and Yoder strict scrutiny test. Under RFRA, “[the
Federal] Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”34
Importantly, this test only applies to sincere and religious claims.35
Claims that are a pretext for avoiding complying with the law and claims
that are “nonreligious in motivation” do not receive special privileges.36
However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to question a claimant’s
religious beliefs, even if the beliefs are not mainstream. For example, the
claimant in Thomas v. Review Board was substantially burdened when
building part of a turret, although he did not religiously object to
fabricating sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses or object to producing
raw materials that would be used to build a tank.37 His religious objections
were “not articulated with . . . clarity and precision,” but the Court allowed
him to draw this line stating that it was “ill equipped” to judicially

28. Id. at 48.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
30. Emp’t Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
35. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, n.28 (2014); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
36. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at n.28; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
37. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710, 715.
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investigate specific religious creeds.38
B. Hobby Lobby
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court used RFRA to invalidate
certain ACA provisions.39 In that case, for-profit, closely-held corporations
religiously objected to the ACA requirement that they pay for their
employees’ contraceptive coverage or face a penalty.40 In applying RFRA,
the Court held that RFRA’s broad protection for religious liberty extends to
for-profit, closely-held corporations.41
The Government in Hobby Lobby argued that the contraceptive
requirement did not burden the companies because the connection between
paying for an employee’s contraception coverage and the destruction of a
beneficiary’s embryo was too attenuated.42 The Court rejected this
argument because it does not inquire whether a belief is reasonable.43 In
effect, the Court held that it must credit the companies’ beliefs about the
“circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that
is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the
commission of an immoral act by another.”44 Thus, it held that the mandate
was a substantial burden and proceeded to apply strict scrutiny.45
The Court assumed that “guaranteeing cost-free access to the . . .
challenged contraceptive methods [was] compelling.”46 Next, the Court
held that least-restrictive alternative test is “exceptionally demanding”47
and was not satisfied because the Government could have possibly paid for
contraceptive coverage.48 Also, the Court stated that the accommodation
would be a less restrictive alternative, but it did not hold that the
accommodation was permissible per se.49
In sum, in light of Hobby Lobby, it is clear that mandating a nonprofit
when it has a sincere religious objection to contraception to either pay for
its employees’ contraception coverage or face a financial penalty violates
38. Id. at 715.
39. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2775.
42. Id. at 2777.
43. Id. at 2778.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2779.
46. Id. at 2780.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 2780–81 (reasoning that the most “straight-forward” way for women to obtain
contraception was for the Government to pay for it, without relying on this alternative).
49. Id. at 2782.
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RFRA. But it is unclear whether the Accommodation is permissible under
RFRA.
C. Procedural History
The Catholic Groups filed suits in nine district courts within the Third,
Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits challenging the accommodation under
RFRA.50 Seven of the suits were at least partially successful in their
respective district courts.51 On appeal, the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits all rejected the Catholic Groups’ claims.52 The only dissenting
panel judge was Judge Baldock in the Tenth Circuit.53 Moreover, all four
circuits denied rehearing en banc.54 Yet multiple judges in the Fifth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits dissented from the denial orders.
After the rehearing denials, the Catholic Groups filed writs of
certiorari.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for each case on
November 6, 2015 and consolidated the appeals.56
Also, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
addressed this issue in cases not consolidated before the Supreme Court.57
The Eight Circuit is the only circuit that ruled for the Catholic Groups.58
III. HOLDING
The Third,

59

60

Fifth, Tenth,61 and D.C. Circuits62 rejected the Catholic

50. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 20.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015);
Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015); Little Sisters of the Poor
Home v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015); E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015).
57. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 24; see also Eternal Word Television Network,
Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 14-12696, 2016 WL 659222, at *1 (11th Cir.
Feb. 18, 2016) (deciding this case for the Government after briefing here).
58. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 24, n.12.
59. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) cert.
granted in part sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva
Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015).
60. E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 444,
(2015).
61. Little Sisters of the Poor Home, 794 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir.) cert. granted sub nom. S.
Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) and cert. granted in part sub nom. Little Sisters of
the Poor Home v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).
62. Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) cert.
granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and
cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).
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Groups’ RFRA claims. Each circuit held that the accommodation does not
substantially burden the groups’ exercise of religion.63 The circuit courts
purported not to question the sincerity of the Catholic Groups’ beliefs.64
However, they refused to accept the the Catholic Groups’ characterization
of the accommodation.65 In other words, the courts purported to believe the
Catholic Groups when the groups claimed that they felt as though their
religious beliefs were substantially burdened, but as a matter of law the
courts determined that they were not substantially burdened.66
The courts held that once an eligible organization “avails itself of the
accommodation, that organization has discharged its legal obligations
under the challenged regulations.”67 The accommodation is a de minimis
burden.68 The circuits reasoned that the Catholic Groups were attempting to
religiously veto the “legally required conduct of third parties” because the
accommodation provides the Catholic Groups an “op-out mechanism that
shifts to third parties the obligation[s]” under the contraceptive mandate. 69
This opt-out “fastidiously relieves Plaintiffs” of anything that might
constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.70
In addition, the D.C. Circuit held the accommodation survived strict
scrutiny under RFRA because it is the least restrictive means of furthering
the Government’s “compelling interest in providing women full and equal
benefits of preventative health coverage.”71 The D.C. Circuit stated that the
Government could only ensure seamless employee contraceptive coverage
if eligible organizations communicate their religious objections via the
accommodation.72 And, even though the mandate exempts some
organizations, the exemptions are limited to the Government’s interest in a
uniform system of laws.73
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners Must Prove The Accommodation Substantially Burdens

63. See, e.g., Geneva Coll, 778 F.3d at 444.
64. See, e.g., id. at 436.
65. See, e.g., id.
66. See, e.g., Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
67. Id. at 250.
68. See, e.g., id. at 249.
69. Id. at 251.
70. Id. at 251– 52.
71. Id. at 264.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 266.
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Their Religious Exercise
1. Catholic Groups’ Arguments
The Catholic Groups argue that the contraceptive mandate forces them
“to engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs on pain
of substantial penalties,” and therefore the mandate is a quintessential
example of a substantial burden to religious exercise.74 It is undisputed that
the non-compliance penalties are severe. The Catholic Groups will be
exposed to the same penalties as the plaintiffs in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
and there the Court determined that such penalties are substantial.75 Also,
the Mandate requires them to act.76 In fact, HHS regulations state that
actions by eligible organizations are “necessary” for employees to get
contraceptive coverage.77
It is not for the Court to question the sincerity of the Catholic Groups’
beliefs. It must accept the Petitioners’ beliefs about private religious
questions like when an innocuous act becomes burdensome—or gives rise
to scandal and material cooperation—as a result of its connection with a
proscribed religious act.78 The Catholic Groups believe that they exercise
religion when they contract with insurance companies and when they
refuse to submit the accommodation notices.79 The Petitioners’ sincerely
held religious beliefs are violated because they are forced to take an action
that facilitates the Government’s conscription of the Catholic Group’s
health care plan infrastructures and TPAs to provide objectionable
coverage.80 The Catholic Groups’ beliefs should not questioned by the
Court.81
Nevertheless, the Government argues and the circuits below held that
(1) the Catholic Groups’ “act” is not a legally recognizable harm because
they are only “opting out” of requirements; and (2) the groups are objecting
to independent, third-party acts. The Catholic Groups respond to this
criticism in two ways.
First, they contend that the Government and circuit courts

74. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 27.
75. Id. at 38–39.
76. Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191 at 47, E. Texas Baptist Univ. v.
Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for ETBU Petitioners].
77. Id.
78. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 32.
79. Id. at 35–36.
80. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 49.
81. Id.
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mischaracterize the accommodation as an “opt-out.”82 In fact, the Catholic
Groups believe the term “accommodation” is also a mischaracterization.83
They prefer to call it the “alternative compliance mechanism” because the
accommodation is actually “a way for religious organizations to ‘compl[y]
with the mandate.’”84 Regardless, the accommodation’s characterization is
not fundamental to their argument because the Court should not inquire
into whether the “opt-out” relieves the Catholic Groups of moral
culpability because that is an inherently religious question.85
Ultimately, the Catholic Groups argue that the opt-out
mischaracterization occurs because the Government and circuits “badly
distort[] the substantial-burden inquiry” by questioning the sincerity of the
groups’ beliefs.86 Circuits have done this by focusing on the de minimis
amount of effort required to complete the accommodation,87 and by
dismissing the Catholic Groups’ theological beliefs about “scandal” and
“material cooperation” that result from filing the notice.88 But as one
Catholic bishop testified, while the forms only take “a few minutes to
sign,” “the ramifications are eternal.”89 The potential significance of
seemingly minor acts was echoed by a Fifth Circuit dissenting judge:
“Thomas More went to the scaffold rather than sign a little paper for the
King.”90 “Plainly it was the scaffold, not the toil of signing, that
substantially burdened his religious beliefs.”91 The Catholic Groups argue
the statute is clear on this point; “RFRA expressly protects ‘any exercise of
religion.’”92 The Government may not compel the Catholic Groups to file
paperwork, call that paperwork necessary for the mandate, and then dismiss
the Catholic Groups’ objections to these requirements, if they are crediting
the Petitioners’ beliefs as sincere.93
Second, the Catholic Groups’ claims are not precluded even though
their religious exercise involves interactions with third parties and

82. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 43.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) (2015)).
85. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 44.
86. Id. at 41.
87. Id. at 41–42.
88. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 48.
89. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 43.
90. E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 630, 635 (5th Cir. 2015) (Jones, J., dissenting)
reh’g denied.
91. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 47–48.
92. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 42 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014)).
93. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 47.
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independent actors.94 The Supreme Court’s precedent is clear: The claimant
in Thomas v. Review Board was religious burdened when he built a turret
although only third parties were going to use the turret in war.95 And in
Hobby Lobby the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion was burdened because their
actions might have enabled a third party to destroy an embryo.96
In any event, the Catholic Groups are not objecting to third-party
action, but rather their own involvement in a contraception scheme.97
Contrary to the Government’s argument, Third Parties are not under an
independent obligation to deliver contraception coverage to the Catholic
Groups’ employees.98 No obligation exists unless the Catholic Groups “(a)
maintain an objectionable contractual relationship with their insurance
companies and then (b) submit the objectionable ‘self-certification’ or
‘notice.’”99 That is why it is necessary for the Government to penalize
Petitioners for not submitting the accommodation notices.100 Responsibility
for providing contraception to employees—and the unique benefit of extra
payment from the Government to the Third Party—only arises after an
eligible organization’s action.101 Thus, the Catholic Groups’ religious
objections are tailored to their own action, not third-party action or internal
government affairs.102
2. Government’s Arguments
According to the Government, the accommodation allows the Catholic
Groups to opt out of the mandate and relieves them of all recognizable
religious burdens.103 After an objection is filed, Catholic Groups are not
“required to exercise any contractual or other authority that they possess to
‘authorize, obligate, or incentivize’ issuers or TPAs to provide
contraception coverage.”104 Instead, the Government mandates that Third
Parties provide coverage through the Government’s independent

94. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 30.
95. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 715 (1981).
96. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
97. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 45.
98. Id. at 4 (The Zubik Petitioners also state “the supposed ‘independent obligation’ is irrelevant
because Petitioners object to hiring or a maintaining a relationship with any insurance company that is
authorized . . . to deliver the objection coverage . . . regardless of [how] that authority, obligation, or
incentive is ‘trigged.’”).
99. Id. at 48–49.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 54–55.
103. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 34–35.
104. Id. at 37.
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authority.105 Thus, although filing a Form 700 or HHS Notice “gives rise to
the occasion for the government to act,” it does not mean the “issuer’s or
TPA’s legal obligation . . . derive[s] from” a Catholic Group’s filing—i.e.,
the Third Parties have an independent obligation.106
The Government dismisses the Catholic Groups’ argument “that the
accommodation is not a true opt-out because an employer that invokes it is
deemed to ‘comply’” with the contraceptive mandate.107 According to the
Government, this is petty semantics. Were the regulations to use “excused”
instead of “complied,” the groups would take the same steps to opt out and
would not be able to show that those steps result in a religious burden.108
This argument is bolstered by the Government’s characterization of the
Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby.109 The Court described the
accommodation as an “opt-out,” and it wrote that the regulations
“effectively exempt” objecting religious employers from the mandate.110
The Government acknowledges that the Court’s description of the
accommodation was dicta, but it argues that the Court correctly describes
how the accommodation works, and its reasoning is persuasive.111
Alternatively, even if the contraceptive mandate burdens the Catholic
Groups, the Government argues that it does not substantially burden
them.112 First, the Government notes that it is the Catholic Groups’ burden
to prove that a regulation substantially burdens their free exercise.113 Next,
the Government points out that pre-Smith decisions recognized that claimed
religious burdens often do not qualify as legally recognizable substantial
burdens. In Bowen v. Roy, the parents’ free exercise of religion was not
legally burdened when the government used their child’s social security
number—in violation of the parents’ sincerely held religious belief that
such use of the social security number was burdensome—because the
claimants were attempting to change internal government rules.114 Similarly
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary, Native Americans were not able to
prevent the government from building through sacred tribal land, although
this “unquestionably substantial[ly] burden[ed]’ them in some sense”

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40 (quoting 45 C.F.R 147.131(c)(1) (2015)).
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 40.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763, n.9 (2014)).
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 34–35.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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because the Government cannot “satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and
desires.”115
The Catholic Groups argue that these cases are distinct; here, the
regulations pressure them to take action, whereas the litigants in Roy and
Lyng objected to Government action. The Government responds that the
claimants in Roy made the same argument—i.e., that the government
forced them to submit an application with their daughter’s social security
number on it.116 The Court in that case distinguished between individual
and government action even if the claimants’ religion did not.117
B. The Government Must Prove A Compelling Interest If The Petitioners
Are Substantially Burdened
1. Catholic Groups’ Arguments
If the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the Catholic Groups’
exercise of religion, the Government must show that the regulation “is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.”118 According to the
Catholic Groups, the Government has not done so here.
The Catholic Groups claim that the Government does not have a
compelling interest in ensuring that women receive full and equal health
coverage, which includes contraceptive coverage, because the Government
has granted many exemptions to the contraceptive mandate.119 When the
Government grants any exemption to a regulatory scheme it is difficult for
that interest to be considered compelling, even more so when there are
multiple exemptions, like here.120
2. Government’s Argument
The Government argues that there is a compelling interest in female
preventive health care coverage, and that exemptions to this rule do not
undermine this interest.121 The Government points out that five justices in
Hobby Lobby determined that the Government “has a compelling interest in

115. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439 (1998).
116. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 46–47.
117. Id.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012).
119. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 59–68. For example, non-religious small
businesses and churches are exempt. Id. at 63–64.
120. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432–33
(2006) (reasoning that exemptions to a law make the government’s purported interests in enforcing the
law less compelling).
121. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 54–55.
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providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of
female employees.”122 The Government writes about the health benefits of
contraception, including many non-pregnancy related benefits.123
Additionally, there is a compelling interest in women having equal access
to health care coverage as men.124
C. The Accommodation Must Be The Least-Restrictive Means Of
Furthering The Government’s Compelling Interest
1. Catholic Groups’ Arguments
The Catholic Groups argue that even if the Government were to meet
its burden of proving a compelling interest in preventive health care
coverage for women, the contraceptive mandate is not the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.125 RFRA’s least-restrictive-means test is
“exceptionally demanding”126 and that test is not met here. Instead of
burdening the Catholic Groups, the Government could allow their
employees to buy contraception-only coverage on an exchange or full
coverage through an exchange as it does for employees of exempt
organizations.127
This would not be difficult for the Government. The Government
would only need to tweak the structure of its existing program.128 Within
the grand scheme of the ACA, modifying the exchanges to comply with
RFRA for the Catholic Groups’ benefit would only be a minor
adjustment.129
Likewise, employees would only have to take minor steps to sign up
for a new health care plan.130 These steps are no more burdensome than
what many people do to receive Medicaid benefits. The Government argues

122. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2785–86) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799–80, n.23 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting)).
123. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55–58 (discussing how contraception
prevents unintended pregnancy, complications from pregnancies, pelvic pain, menstrual disorders, and
certain cancers).
124. Id. at 58.
125. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72.
126. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
127. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72; Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at
77.
128. See Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 72 (reasoning Catholic Groups could be
exempt from providing contraception without burdening the government because adequate mechanisms
already exist).
129. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 76.
130. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 73.
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these additional steps would make coverage less accessible to certain
women, but “the government may not ‘assume a plausible, less restrictive
alternative would be ineffective’ just because it ‘requires a consumer to
take action.’”131 The Catholic Groups concede that some employees would
not qualify for the exchanges as they are currently structured.132 However,
the employees of exempt organizations are in the same situation, and
RFRA “may in some circumstances require the Government to expend
additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs.”133
Moreover, Catholic Groups proffer non-exchange based less restrictive
alternatives: The Government could use Title X funds to pay for
contraceptive coverage.134 Or the Government could provide the employees
coverage through Medicaid, Medicare, or a refundable tax credit.135
Similar to their argument that there is no compelling government
interest, the Catholic Groups argue that the Government cannot claim that
the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its
interests when it applies less religiously burdensome regulations to exempt
organizations.136 In other words, the Government has not explained why
rules that work for exempt organizations cannot apply to the currently
accommodated organizations.
2. Government’s Argument
The Government argues that the contraceptive mandate will not be as
effective if there are costs or burdens placed on women.137 There is a
benefit to “seamless” health care coverage, which is not possible if women
have to take additional steps to receive contraceptive coverage, because
even a minor hindrance to access leads to adverse consequences like
unintended and risky pregnancies.138 And any additional steps women
would have to take to receive health care coverage would place them at a
disadvantage compared to men.139
According to the Government, the Catholic Groups’ proffered less
restrictive alternatives are not valid alternatives under RFRA because they

131. Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)).
132. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 73–74.
133. Id. at 73–74 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014)).
134. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 75 (noting that Title X is a program devoted to
providing family planning services and it is available to any public entity).
135. Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 81–82.
136. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 77.
137. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 74–75.
138. Id. at 74–76.
139. Id. at 75.
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raise costs and increase burdens on women.140 Moreover, many of the
purported alternatives would require new laws or regulations.141 These
plans “operate outside any ‘existing, recognized, workable, and alreadyimplemented framework to provide coverage.’”142 This is unlike in Hobby
Lobby where the accommodation was an “already-existing mechanism” for
providing contraceptive coverage.143
Moreover, the Catholic Groups put forth a limitless interpretation of
RFRA because objecting employers could receive exemptions from such
things as minimum wage laws and immunization requirements.144
According to the Government, there is no way Congress intended such
absurd results when enacting RFRA.145
Finally, the Government claims the Catholic Groups’ alternatives are
unfeasible because insurance companies do not provide contraception-only
coverage; the Government could only provide such coverage by
implementing new laws or regulations.146 Nor is it feasible for the
Government to assume the cost of subsidizing all health care coverage for
female employees if the Government adopted the Catholic Groups’ other
exchange plan. According to the Government, the key analysis is whether
there is a less restrictive alternative “available.”147 None of these options
are available.
V. ANALYSIS
Under RFRA, a plaintiff must first prove that it has a sincere religious
belief that is substantially burdened by the regulation. If it does so, the
Government must prove that the regulation furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.
Here, the Catholic Groups have proven that the accommodation
substantially burdens their free exercise: it mandates that they facilitate
access to contraception that they are religiously opposed to providing. The
Government may be able to prove that the accommodation furthers a
compelling interest in women’s health and equality, but it has not shown

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 79 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014)).
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 54.
Id. at 79–80.
Id.
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 84 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)).
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that the accommodation is the least-restrictive means of furthering this
compelling interest—the Government could provide contraception using
ACA exchanges without conscripting the Catholic Groups.
A. The Catholic Groups Are Substantially Burdened By The Contraceptive
Mandate
The Court should hold that the contraceptive mandate substantially
burdens the Catholic Groups. The Catholic Groups accurately characterize
some of the Government’s arguments as attacks on the sincerity of their
beliefs, which all parties have acknowledged is impermissible. To be sure,
there is a certain appeal to the Government’s position. All it requires is that
the Catholic Groups file a one-page notice. And the Government is correct
that interpreting RFRA as broadly as the Catholic Groups seek may impede
the Government’s ability to enact its policy goals.148 However, RFRA
requires that the Government take the Catholic Groups claims on their face
as sincere.
Thus, the Court must accept that filing the objection and maintaining a
contractual relationship with a party that provides an organization’s
employees contraception and abortifacients is a burden on religious
exercise. As the Government notes, this does not necessarily mean that as a
legal matter the Catholic Groups are substantially burdened, but the
Government must give these groups’ religious beliefs deference.
If, instead of filing a Form 700 or HHS Notice, the Government
mandated that organizations flip a light switch on a Saturday in order to
object to providing contraceptive coverage, it seems unlikely anyone would
question an Orthodox Jewish organization’s opposition to this practice.149
The Court would apply strict scrutiny to that regulation. The Government
treats these situations differently only because it is unwilling to allow
religious organizations to claim that an administrative notice burdens them.
But RFRA is clear. Arguments in favor of administrative convenience are
irrelevant to whether the burden on religion is substantial. In effect, the
Government is collapsing RFRA’s least-restrictive inquiry with its
substantial burden inquiry.
To be sure, if the Catholic Groups were truly able to opt out of the
mandate, as the Government contends, the Catholic Groups would not be

148. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 48–49 (discussing different parades of
horribles).
149. See Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 42–43 (discussing how de minimis actions
under Supreme Court precedent are substantial burdens).
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substantially burdened. Likewise, the Government is correct that the
Catholic Groups may not object to internal government policies or thirdparty independent conduct. However, the accommodation does not truly
opt out the Catholic Groups; they are directly burdened. And the Catholic
Groups’ opposition to the contraceptive mandate does not derive from
opposition to internal government policies or third-party conduct.
The Government contends that filing the Form 700 or HHS Notice
“gives rise to the occasion for the government to act,” but that the “issuer’s
or TPA’s legal obligation” does not “derive from” the filing.150 But the rules
are quite clear. To be an eligible organization and thus accommodated, a
religious non-profit, such as the Catholic Groups, must file a Form 700 or
HHS Notice.151 And “[w]hen [the notice] is provided to an issuer, the issuer
has sole responsibility for providing” the contraception coverage.152
Likewise, if a TPA receives a copy of the Form 700 or DOL Notice, and
agrees to remain in a contractual relationship with the eligible organization,
then the TPA “shall provide or arrange payments for contraceptive
services.”153 Thus, the Catholic Groups must file a notice for any third party
obligation to arise.
The Government’s argument is further undermined by regulations that
state that the Form 700 or HHS Notice will cause an eligible organization
to comply with the Mandate.154 The Government argues that this is a petty
semantics because if the word “exempts” had replaced “complies” in the
regulation, the effect would be the same, and the Catholic Groups would
not be burdened.155 But this is unsound for two reasons.
First, words have meanings. The Government, through its rule making,
states that the eligible organizations’ filing of the accommodation is as an
act of compliance with a requirement that the Government knows the
groups are religiously opposed to facilitating. It would not have
characterized the accommodation this way in light of its knowledge about
religious organizations’ objections to the contraceptive mandate unless
filing a notice truly caused these religious groups to comply with the rule.
In other words, the Government used “complies” instead of “exempt”
because the Government recognizes a functional difference. Second, the
Government’s argument fails because IRS “religious employers” are

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 38.
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4) (2015).
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1)(i).
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2015).
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c).
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 40.
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exempt from the mandate entirely. Giving a church an exemption because
of its religious objections is strong evidence that there is an objectionable
act performed when an organization complies with the accommodation.
Additionally, the Government’s own characterization of the mandate
defeats its argument that Third Parties have an independent obligation to
provide the Catholic Groups’ employees contraceptive coverage. There
would be no need to force the Catholic Groups to file the accommodation
if Third Parties already have an independent obligation to provide the
female employees coverage regardless of the Catholic Groups’ actions.156
Also, the Government’s reliance on Burwell v. Hobby Lobby’s
characterization of the mandate is misplaced. To be sure, in dicta the Court
wrote that the accommodation opted out and “effectively exempt[ed]”
objecting religious employers from the mandate.157 But the Court was only
reasoning that the accommodation was a less burdensome alternative than
forcing the claimants to pay for contraceptive services; it did not hold that
the accommodation was permissible per se, and it did not analyze whether
the accommodation could also be a substantial burden.158
Moreover, cases like Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery and Bowen v.
Roy do not support the Government’s argument that the Catholic Groups
are attempting to impermissibly interfere with internal government
policy.159 Here, unlike in those cases, the Petitioners are complaining about
regulations that burden them directly. The Government argues that the
litigants in Roy made the same argument as the Catholic Groups—i.e., if
and only if the Roy parents filed a public benefit form would the
Government use the daughter’s social security number in violation of the
parents’ religious beliefs.160
But Roy does not support the Government’s argument. The Roy parents
did not argue that filing a benefits form without a social security number
would violate their religious belief per se, as the Catholic Groups do here
with a notice.161 Instead, the parents argued that it was a violation of their
religious beliefs for the Government to use their daughter’s social
security.162 Their only objection to filing the benefits form was that they

156. See Brief for Zubik Petitioners, supra note 20, at 51–52 (reasoning that the Government
would not require notices if they were meaningless).
157. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763, n.9 (2014).
158. See id. (discussing the accommodation as a possible less restrictive alternative).
159. Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 54.
160. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 36.
161. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 697 (1986).
162. Id.
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had to include their daughter’s number on the form.163 This case actually
supports the Catholic Groups’ argument because a majority of the Justices
determined that the Government was religiously burdening the family by
forcing the parents to include the daughter’s social security number on the
form. If including a social security number on a form is a religious burden,
a form which enables and triggers abortifacient use is also a religious
burden.
Finally, an analogy illustrates how the accommodation substantially
burdens religious exercise. According to the Government, under the
Catholic Groups’ interpretation of RFRA, “[a] conscientious objector to the
draft could claim that the act of identifying himself as such on his Selective
Service card constitutes a substantial burden because that identification
would then trigger the draft of a fellow selective service registrant in his
place.”164 Clearly this would be an awful result. The Catholic Groups
proffer a different analogy: “a conscientious objector who (quite
reasonably) objects to a government policy that allows him to avoid
military service only by providing a form that both identifies and obligates
a family member or friend to serve in his stead” is obviously burdened.165
The Catholic Groups’ analogy more accurately describes the
accommodation because filing the objection identifies a specific Third
Party and obligates that Third Party to provide contraceptive services. Just
as the Catholic Groups could not object to anyone getting drafted, they are
not objecting to any party providing their employees contraception. For
example, the Government could pay for the employees’ coverage. But the
Catholic Groups’ religious beliefs are burdened when their action
“identifies and obligates” a party with which they have a pre-existing
relationship to provide services they object to providing.
B. The Government Has A Compelling Interest In Providing Contraceptive
Services To Women
The Court should hold—or at least assume without deciding—that
there is a compelling interest here. There is no question that contraception
provides women numerous health benefits. The Catholic Groups skirt away
from addressing these benefits seemingly because it is obvious.166
Nevertheless, the Catholic Groups contend that typically the Government

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 48.
Brief for ETBU Petitioners, supra note 76, at 45.
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 55.
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in a strict scrutiny context cannot claim that an interest is compelling but
then enact numerous exemptions to the regulation designed to accomplish
the interest.167
Insofar as exemptions to regulations defeat the Government’s
compelling interest arguments in other contexts, in light of Hobby Lobby
there is a compelling interest here. Five Justices thought so in Hobby
Lobby, and their rationales apply just as strongly to this case. Although the
Catholic Groups’ argument about numerous exemptions do not defeat the
Government’s claim for a compelling interest, these arguments are key to
resolving the least-restrictive-alternative inquiry.
C. The Catholic Groups Proffer Alternatives That Are Less Restrictive
Than The Accommodation
It is too difficult for the Government to prove that the accommodation
is the least-restrictive means of providing women preventive care
equivalent to the preventative care that men receive. The Catholic Groups’
most plausible proffered alternative is that the Government could allow
their employees to buy contraception-only coverage through the existing
ACA exchanges. Recipients of these plans would have two healthcare
cards: one from their employer covering everything but contraception and
one from an exchange plan only covering contraception.
The Government mischaracterizes the Catholic Groups’ plan as an
impermissible new program. The ACA dramatically changed the United
States health care industry. When examining the effect of the Catholic
Groups’ proffered alternatives to the mandate, one must look at the ACA as
a whole. This dispute is just another case in a line of cases defining the
constitutionality and statutory permissibility of the new ACA program.
Given the total amount of ACA subsidies already provided by the
Government, the Catholic Groups’ proffered alternative would cost very
little additional money and would only require minor tweaks to the ACA’s
regulatory scheme. Certainly the Government can offer contraception-only
coverage through exchanges. The ACA exchanges could have initially been
designed this way. Instead, the Government decided to use an
accommodation that burdens religious exercise. It is a weak argument for
the Government to now claim that this alternative, one that would have
easily been implemented when the exchanges were designed, is an
impermissible alternative to the accommodation.

167.

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433 (2006).
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Moreover, the Government asserts that it should not have to assume the
cost of providing contraceptive coverage to women via the exchanges. But
under the accommodation the Government—not the Catholic Groups—
pays Third Parties a premium to provide contraception. There is no reason
to expect that paying for this contraceptive coverage through an exchange
program will cost significantly more than paying Third Parties.
The Government’s strongest argument is that women, if they have to
take additional steps to receive preventive care via an exchange, will not
receive coverage equal to what men receive. By definition, if women have
to take an extra step than men, they are not on an equal footing. To be sure,
under the Catholic Groups’ exchange-based plans, female employees will
have to take some additional steps to receive coverage. But the effort
required of female employees under the Catholic Groups’ plan is de
minimis—a few clicks on the website. Thus, there is a permissible less
restrictive alternative.168
CONCLUSION
The accommodation’s notice is only a piece of paper to most people,
but the Catholic Groups’ sincere religious objections to the accommodation
have to be credited. RFRA applies here because the Catholic Groups are
substantially burden. And the Government fails to defend the
accommodation under the exceptionally demanding strict scrutiny test
because there are less restrictive alternatives available to the Government
to accomplish its goals that do not burden the Catholic Groups. The Court
should strike down the accommodation. Doing so will not give the Catholic
Groups a key to the kingdom, but it is better for them than going to hell in a
HHS notice.

168. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (reasoning an alternative
was less restrictive even though it required consumers to take more action than the existing regulatory
scheme).

